Metro Magazine, September/October 2015

Congress had set aside investment streams dedicated to transit capital purchases This funding program originally known as Section 3 and then Section 5309 was divided into three categories 40 for new rail starts i e light rail systems 40 for rail modernization for the nations legacy rail transit operators i e the NYC subway and Chicagos El train and 20 for bus purchases This arrangement survived the coming and going of such federal transportation legislation as ISTEA TEA 21 and SAFETEA LU But the end of SAFETEALU in 2009 marked its end The politicization and turning away from federal earmarks coincided with the end of SAFETEA LU Thats important because the Section 5309 programs dedicated bus capital program which had grown to 980 million in 2009 was entirely earmarked by Congress Three years of SAFETEA LU extensions saw the Federal Transit Administration FTA step in to ensure dedicated federal bus capital funding with a competitive program it called State of Good Repair But the FTA short changed the program by one third shrinking overall dedicated bus capital by 300 million Thus began the bus capital crisis In the spring of 2012 the Senates original proposal for what became MAP 21 included no dedicated bus capital program Both New Starts and Rail Modernization curiously renamed State of Good Repair in MAP 21 but not at all investing in buses as it previously had the dedicated rail capital programs grew significantly but bus operators were left with slight increases in the formula programs Sections 5307 5311 that were largely created by the bills rescission and re programming of JARC and New Freedom dollars ADVOCACY COLLABORATION Thats where advocacy groups Community Transportation Association of America CTAA and the Bus Coalition collaboration entered the picture Bringing together rural and urban bus operators CTAA and the Bus Coalition developed an amendment that eventually led to the creation of the Section 5339 formula bus program It was a hollow victory however because the program was eventually funded at just 427 million a nearly 60 reduction from the dedicated bus capital high water mark of 980 million in 2009 The funding would follow the Section 5307 formula with the exception of 125 million set aside for each state Not surprisingly this low funding level along with the inability to compete for additional dedicated bus capital when bulk purchases or a facility was needed posed the industry major challenges Individual operators and states soon understood the negative impact of MAP 21 on the nations bus fleets Consider the following An as of t oday unpublished 2014 report titled Estimating the Long Term Impact of MAP 21 on the Nations Rural Transit Bus Infrastructure by Parsons Brinckerhoff notes maintaining MAP 21 and historic funding levels Section 5311 results in a significant degradation of the condition of the rural public transit infrastructure The same report estimates that to erase the deferred capital replacement deficit in the rural transit industry would require a one time 700 million investment MAP 21 offers just more than 60 million annually thus increasing the rural transit capital deficit every year North Dakota has an estimated bus capital deficit of 99 million yet the entire state receives 13 million annually through Section 5339 Birmingham Ala s MAX urban 44 mETRO mAGAZINE SEPTEMBER OCTOBER 2015 metro magazine com BUS CAPITAL CRISIS Birmingham Ala s MAX has a bus capital replacement need of 294 million over the next four years double what the entire state of Alabama will receive in Section 5339 funds Flint Mich s urban transit operation estimates that it spends between 35000 and 40000 monthly just to keep its aging bus fleet operational BJCTA Flint MTA